NUCLEAR DETERRENCE THEORY, NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AND NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE by ROBERT POWELL

Cover of: NUCLEAR DETERRENCE THEORY, NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AND NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE | ROBERT POWELL

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In: Online version of print publication INTERNATIONAL SECURITY v.27 #4 (Spring 2003) : 86-118.

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Open LibraryOL19601603M

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Jun 16,  · On December 17,President George W. Bush ordered the deployment of a national missile defense (NMD).Proponents of missile defenses, both inside and outside the Bush administration, argue that, absent NMD, the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the greater U.S.

vulnerability that this entails will significantly limit the United States' ability to secure it foreign policy goals. Deterrence theory is the idea that an inferior force, by virtue of the destructive power of the force's weapons, could deter a more powerful adversary, provided that this force could be protected against destruction by a surprise attack.

This doctrine gained increased prominence as a military strategy during the Cold War with regard to the use of nuclear weapons and is related to, but distinct.

Apr 01,  · It is the backstop and foundation of our national defense. A strong nuclear deterrent also contributes to U.S. non-proliferation goals by limiting the incentive for allies to have their own. A nuclear weapon (also called an atom bomb, nuke, atomic bomb, nuclear warhead, A-bomb, or nuclear bomb) is an explosive device that derives its destructive force from nuclear reactions, either fission (fission bomb) or from a combination of fission and fusion reactions (thermonuclear bomb).Both bomb types release large quantities of energy from relatively small amounts of matter.

Yet Roehrig only briefly touches upon this fact in the book A strong Japan and South Korea armed with conventional precision strike and ballistic missile defense (BMD) capabilities could reduce the relative importance of the nuclear umbrella in extended deterrence.

While the U.S. nuclear umbrella may still be valuable for deterring the use. Feb 15,  · An annotated Foreign Affairs syllabus on nuclear proliferation. The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) has provided a great service with this analysis of the nuclear network masterminded by A.

Khan, the man former CIA Director George Tenet described as "at least as dangerous as Osama bin Laden."Author: Bradley A. Thayer. The British Government announced its intention in July to modernize its strategic nuclear deterrent with the deployment of the Trident I (C4) submarine-launched ballistic missile.

The MIRVed Trident missile will have significantly increased NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AND NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE book of range, payload and target numbers. Feb 21,  · From RAND's Soviet-era work on game theory to today's current states of concern, such as North Korea and Iran, RAND has applied strategic analysis to international deterrence efforts, with particular focus on the roles of both diplomacy and missile.

Oct 26,  · Chinese Nuclear Proliferation: How Global Politics Is Transforming China’s Weapons Buildup and Modernization by Susan Turner Haynes. Potomac Books,pp.

In Chinese Nuclear Proliferation, Susan Haynes provides a thoughtful, in-depth look at China’s nuclear force, deftly merging both theory and bowvalleychorus.com author makes academic international relations theory accessible and.

Mar 20,  · This concept, however, often lumps states into either the “nuclear club” through the Classic Deterrence Theory, discounting individual state motivations, or potential emerging nuclear states, who the US must counter on nuclear proliferation.

NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AND NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE book current deterrence theory often neglects adversarial motivations, still viewing nuclear weapons. Jul 18,  · ‘Nuclear Deterrence Theory, Nuclear Proliferation, and National Missile Defense’, International Security, 27(4): pp.

Sagan, S.D. ‘Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?: Three Models in Search of a Bomb’, International Security, 21(3): pp. Before you download your free e-book, please consider donating to support.

In the post-Cold War era, the United States has a strong reason to define the deterrent role of nuclear weapons to be as separate NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AND NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE book possible from other means of deterring armed conflict. Several factors support such a widened gap.

The first is that the United States is now the world's preeminent. Page APPENDIX E Nuclear Weapons in Post-Cold War Deterrence. John C. Hopkins 1 (retired) and Steven A. Maaranen, Los Alamos National Laboratory.

INTRODUCTION: A DEFINITION OF DETERRENCE "The current questioning of nuclear deterrence implies. Oct 13,  · Exporting the Bomb: Technology Transfer and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons by Matthew Kroenig.

Cornell University Press,pp. In recent years, the nuclear aspirations of North Korea and Iran have stoked fears that a new wave of proliferation is underway. In its White Paper on Defence and National Security, France claims that its deterrence strategy is strictly defensive and that “The use of nuclear weapons would only be conceivable in extreme circumstances of legitimate self-defense” and that nuclear deterrence “protects France from any State-led aggression against its vital.

Powell, “Nuclear Deterrence Theory, Nuclear Proliferation, and National Missile Defense,” pp. Brigadier General Feroz Hassan Khan is the former director of arms control and disarmament affairs in the Strategic Plans Division of the Joint Services Headquarters of Pakistan.

For a time after World War II, America held the upper hand with regards to nuclear superiority. It used this threat of "massive retaliation" as a means to deter Soviet aggression. By the late s the Soviet Union had built up a convincing nuclear arsenal that could be delivered on the territory of the United States and Western Europe.

By the mids unilateral deterrence gave way to. For example, classical deterrence theory argues that national missile defense undermines the stability of deterrence (for example, Powell ), whereas an application of perfect deterrence theory.

Proliferation Organization Theory, Deterrence Theory, and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons An apparent contra-diction lies at the center of our understandings about nuclear weapons and deterrence. On the one hand, it is widely believed that nuclear weapons were an important factor in maintaining the "long peace" between the United.

In the second part, we examine the infl uence of technological innovation on existing norms and regimes in four cases-biological weapons (bw), nuclear proliferation, nuclear testing, and anti. 82 Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age missile that broke up in flight struck a makeshift U.S.

barracks in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, killing 28 and wounding This single strike accounted for the largest number of U.S. combat casualties in the war. In Israel and the United States there was concern thatCited by: Jan 13,  · The Deterrence and Assurance Conversation. January 13, Introduction.

As we survey the world today, we find the nuclear landscape to be more uncertain and precarious than it has been at any time since the end of the Cold War.

“No Cities Speech by Secretary of Defense McNamara.” National Science Digital Library. Powell, Robert. Nuclear deterrence theory: The search for credibility. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Bracken seems to look beyond the problem of nuclear proliferation, instead accepting a growing multitude of nuclear nations as a.

Dec 13,  · Nuclear Deterrence In a New Age Dr. Keith B. Payne Dr. Keith B. Payne is a co-founder of the National Institute for Public Policy, the director of the Graduate School of Defense and Strategic Studies at Missouri State University and a former deputy assistant secretary of defense.

Select Literature on U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy and Nuclear History. Detailed study of nuclear weapons accidents analyzed using the lens of organization theory. Nuclear Intelligence. Proliferation Watch: A Historical Sociology of Nuclear Missile Guidance (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, ).

The interrelations of technology. Paradox of power: Sino-American strategic restraint in an age of vulnerability / (Washington, DC: Published for the Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs, Institute for National Stratetic Studies, by National Defense University Press ; [Place of publication not identified]: Books Express, ©), by David C.

Gompert, Phillip C. Deterrence, Missile Defense & Space Following are all current, recent, and past IFPA projects, publications, conferences, workshops, articles, and presentations about nuclear deterrence, missile defense, and/or space capabilities. A systematic critical survey of American strategic thinking and the strategic culture in which it is formed.

In particular, this book seeks to interrogate the theory and strategy of nuclear deterrence, and its relationship to the concept of missile defence.

Sep 01,  · Timely and thoughtful analysis of U.S. nuclear deterrence in Northeast Asia. Global Asia The book provides a helpful overview for anyone seeking to understand the dilemmas that the United States faces when attempting to protect allies with nuclear threats, especially when it comes to Japan and South Korea.

Texas National Security Review. ‘Nina Tannenwald has written a powerful and provocative book examining the influence of ethical norms on U.S. leaders' nuclear weapons decisions.

Her thesis that a nuclear taboo has taken hold will be widely read and hotly debated in both university classrooms and inside defense ministries in all nuclear nations.’Cited by: Oct 13,  · Japan, South Korea, and the United States Nuclear Umbrella: Deterrence After the Cold War (Contemporary Asia in the World) [Terence Roehrig] on bowvalleychorus.com *FREE* shipping on qualifying offers.

For close to sixty years, the United States has maintained alliances with Japan and South Korea that have included a nuclear umbrellaCited by: 3. Japan, South Korea, and the United States Nuclear Umbrella: Deterrence After the Cold War (Contemporary Asia in the World) - Kindle edition by Terence Roehrig.

Download it once and read it on your Kindle device, PC, phones or tablets. Use features like bookmarks, note taking and highlighting while reading Japan, South Korea, and the United States Nuclear Umbrella: Deterrence After the Cold 5/5(1).

The balance of conventional military capabilities is intrinsic to understanding patterns of war among nations. However, cumulative knowledge relating to the effects of nuclear weapons possession on conflict interaction is largely absent.

Framework is provided for analyzing the results of quantitative empirical research on this question and to identify any extant strong and consistent patterns Cited by: 1.

Nuclear Deterrence, Then and Now. Extended deterrence may be even more important today, in an era marked by the proliferation of wmd and long-range strike systems, than it was during the Cold War. eds. Transforming Nuclear Deterrence (National Defense University Press, ), We evaluate a variety of explanations in two stages of nuclear proliferation, the presence of nuclear weapons production programs and the actual possession of nuclear weapons.

We examine proliferation quantitatively, using data collected by the authors on national latent nuclear weapons production capability and several other variables, while Cited by: Dec 01,  · A systematic critical survey of American strategic thinking and the strategic culture in which it is formed.

In particular, this book seeks to interrogate the theory and strategy of nuclear deterrence, and its relationship to the concept of missile bowvalleychorus.com: Reuben Steff.

@article{osti_, title = {A Technical and Policy Toolkit for Cyber Deterrence and Stability}, author = {Donnelly, David A. and Clements, Samuel L. and Weise, Rachel A. and Goychayev, Rustam}, abstractNote = {In the post-World War II era, nuclear deterrence and arms control established a strategic equilibrium between the superpowers that has come under increasing threat as cyber conflict.

Jan 16,  · Nuclear Superiority and the Balance of Resolve: Explaining Nuclear Crisis Outcomes - Volume 67 Issue 1 - Matthew Kroenig. Nuclear Deterrence Theory, Nuclear Proliferation, and Cited by: proliferation policy; Nuclear modernization, Divestment, economic sanctions, nuclear forensics, DTRA and Nunn-Lugar, missile defense, border and maritime security, the Proliferation Security Initiative, immigration reform and energy reform.

Proper support for Defense Budgets. Our nuclear forces must be supported by deliberately developed complementary non-nuclear capabilities. We should analyze the blend among conventional and nuclear capabilities as well as the contributions and limitations of conventional forces, to include space, cyber, and missile defense, in producing overall strategic deterrence.

Challenging Minimum Deterrence: Articulating The Contemporary Relevance Of Nuclear Weapons – Analysis weapons can be credibly optimized in terms of national defense policy. this logic in.The Nonproliferation Review is a refereed journal concerned with the causes, consequences, and control of the spread of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons.

The Review features case studies, theoretical analyses, historical studies, reports, viewpoints, and book reviews on such issues as state-run weapons programs, treaties and export controls, safeguards, verification and compliance.The essys in this collection explore and analyze how to reduce the risk of nuclear war in South Asia.

Contributors work to introduce the theory and methodology of nuclear risk reduction, to provide specific measures that might work best in the region, and to consider the consequences of missile defense options for stability in Asia.

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